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Abstract 
 
Globalisation and the information revolution made engaging in the conquest for “people’s 
hearts and minds” inevitable for international actors in order to be able to exert political 
and economic influence. Recent protests in Ukraine, which led to a change of the 
Ukrainian leadership and an international crisis, proved the power of public opinion. Even 
though the role of public diplomacy in IR is indisputable, there is still a significant gap in 
the IR literature on this topic, especially on public diplomacy of supranational actors. This 
thesis analyses public diplomacy of the EU in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014 and its 
influence on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. Ukraine has a strategic 
importance for the EU and for the stability of the region. Ukraine’s geopolitical position, 
as well as competing western and eastern influences make the study of public diplomacy 
in Ukraine very relevant.  In this thesis I analyse EU public diplomacy in Ukraine though 
the lenses of seven principal methods of EU public diplomacy- listening, advocacy, 
cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting and media, branding and development. On 
the basis of examination of these seven methods, changes in EU public diplomacy and the 
study of public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine, I argue that conducting public 
diplomacy though institutionalized political frameworks increases visibility and efficiency 
of the public diplomacy and therefore has a better chance to influence perceptions of a 
foreign public. I demonstrate that after the EU launched the European Neighbourhood 
Policy in 2004 and Eastern Partnership in 2009 public support for the EU in Ukraine 
increased. Furthermore, I argue that whilst some of the methods of EU public diplomacy 
have a stable and gradual effect on the public opinion, others have a shorter but more 
noticeable impact. Specifically, mechanisms of public diplomacy that appeal to people’s 
values have a more stable and gradual impact on the public opinion, whereas mechanisms 
that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less stable but more visible effect. 
Moreover, this research reveals that the European Neighbourhood Policy is primarily 
focused on financial aid and assistance in development and other important tools of public 
diplomacy are, despite some progress reached in the past years, still neglected. 
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Introduction  
 
“In a global information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and 
diplomacy are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army 
wins, but also on whose story wins." (Joseph S. Nye, 2005)  
 
In November 2013 hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians rallied in Independence Square in 
Kiev demanding closer ties with the EU. Protests and civil unrests came as a reaction to 
President Yanukovych’s decision to suspend preparations for signing of a new Association 
Agreement with the EU.  The wave of demonstrations that entered history under the name 
“Euromaidan” resulted in a changing of the Ukrainian leadership and an intentional crisis. 
The Deposition of pro-Russian President Yanukovych triggered counter protests of pro-
Russian activists in the east and south of the country. Clashes between pro-Western and pro-
Russian activists resulted in numerous casualties and turned Ukraine into a battlefield. The 
Crimean peninsula in the south-east of the county largely populated by an ethnic Russian 
majority became the centre of Pro-Russian protests. After Russia took control of Crimea, the 
Ukraine crisis gained momentum and turned into an international crisis involving major world 
powers. Protests that led to the change of the Ukrainian leadership along with the geopolitical 
game of chess between the West and Russia demonstrate the power of public opinion. It is 
indisputable that public opinion matters and therefore it is important to understand how it is 
formed and changed. Even though the term “public diplomacy” is relatively novel, 
international actors have been employing its methods throughout history in order to influence 
opinions of a foreign pubic. In this thesis I analyse what influence EU Public Diplomacy has 
had on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. This Eastern European state has 
been in an identity crisis since its independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union. In 2004, after 
the EU enlargement, Ukraine found itself sharing borders with two world powers: the EU on 
the west and the Russian Federation on the east. Since Ukraine gained independence there 
have been many debates regarding its geopolitical choices between a partnership with Russia 
or the EU. The Political and cultural situation in the region makes the concept of public 
diplomacy highly relevant. Ukraine has shifted its course several times over the last decades. 
This thesis aims to help to understand changes in Ukrainian foreign policy by analysing 
methods that the EU, one on the most influential actors in Ukraine, is using to shape 
Ukrainian public opinion. 
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Analysis of EU public diplomacy is not beneficial only for a better understanding of 
development in Ukraine but it also helps in understanding EU soft power and its influence. 
Cross (2013) claims that public diplomacy is of a great importance to the EU for several 
reasons. Firstly, there is a substantial gap between the EU accomplishments and how it is 
perceived in the world. In 2005, the average world awareness of the EU was 69 per cent, thus 
41 per cent of the world still does not know that the EU exists. At the same time, out of 69 per 
cent of the world population that is aware of the existence of the EU, significant part had 
neutral or negative attitudes towards the EU (Gallup International, 2005). Furthermore, with 
regard to humanitarian aid the EU was largely perceived as weak in comparison to other 
world institutions such as the United Nations, World Food Programme, UNICEF, etc.  Merely 
41 per cent of the respondents evaluated the EU´s activity in humanitarian aid as positive. 
These figures are shocking considering that according to figures published by the European 
Commission, the EU as a whole has been the world's biggest donor of humanitarian aid 
(European Commission, 2012). Public Diplomacy is a mechanism that can help the EU to 
promote its success and increase awareness of the EU. Second reason why public diplomacy 
is essential for the EU, especially in times of a rise in Eurosceptism, is that an effective public 
diplomacy can influence and strengthen EU identity also within its borders. Cross (2013) 
advocates that public diplomacy and domestic policy are interdependent. Internal politics 
influence public diplomacy but also vice versa as public diplomacy influences how EU 
citizens perceive themselves.  Thirdly, the Euro crisis, Eurosceptism and internal frictions that 
the EU had to withstand in the last years sapped the EU´s soft power and public diplomacy 
can be an effective tool to limit the extent of harm to the EU´s image (Melissen, 2013). 
Effective public diplomacy can increase the EU´s soft power and strengthen its position in the 
international arena. The EU has to endeavour not only to be, but also to be seen as, an 
important actor in world politics.  
 
Public diplomacy towards Ukraine is especially important for EU foreign policy. The EU’s 
official website states that Ukraine is “a priority partner” within the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) (EEAS b, n.d.). Ukraine´s position at the crossroads of the West and East 
destines it to be in a zone of clashing geopolitical interests. Development in Ukraine has an 
impact on stability of the region. Moreover, the energy security of the EU is significantly 
linked to Ukraine, which is the main transit state for energy resources from Russia. Twenty 
per cent of the total gas consumed in the EU is transited through Ukraine.  
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Due to the globalization and growing interdependence, attraction and persuasion have become 
increasingly important foreign policy instruments; nonetheless public diplomacy is still 
neglected in the IR literature. Moreover, a prevalent part of the public diplomacy research is 
“historical (Cold War) and US centric” (Cross, 2013, p.3). This thesis aims to fill this gap and 
contribute to academic discussion on this highly relevant topic.    
 
In this thesis I will attempt to answer the following research question: 
• What influence did EU public diplomacy have on the foreign policy preferences of the 
Ukrainian Public between 2004 and 2014? 
Sub-questions: 
• What changes in the EU public diplomacy policy had the most significant impact on 
Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU? 
• How did the different mechanisms of public diplomacy influence Ukrainian attitudes 
towards the EU?  
 
I argue that conducting public diplomacy though institutionalized political frameworks 
increases its visibility, efficiency and therefore has a larger impact on public opinion 
formation. I show that after the EU established the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Eastern Partnership the support for the EU rose. Furthermore, I argue that different methods 
of EU public diplomacy have different impacts on Ukrainian public opinion. Mechanisms of 
public diplomacy that appeal to people’s values  have a more stable and gradual impact on the 
public opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less 
stable but more noticeable effect on public opinion. 
 
In order to verify my hypothesis I conduct a case study on the EU’s public diplomacy in 
Ukraine between 2004 and 2014. I look at EU public diplomacy through the lenses of the 
seven methods that the EU is using to engage with the Ukrainian public- listening, advocacy, 
cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media, branding and 
development aid. I analyse how these methods are employed and scrutinise their distinct 
influence. Through analyses of public opinion polls conducted between the 2004 and 2014 I 
will assess how changes in EU public diplomacy and different public diplomacy mechanisms 
translated into the changes in Ukrainian foreign policy choice. 
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This thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter I will introduce the theoretical 
framework and the research design. The second chapter provides background information 
about EU-Ukraine relations and the third chapter is focused on analysis of methods of EU 
public diplomacy in Ukraine and their influence on Ukrainian public perception.  
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Literature Review 
 
As a consequence of the increased importance of public diplomacy in international relations, 
the topic attracted the attention of various scholars and policymakers. However, as outlined in 
the introduction, the literature review of the available publications on public diplomacy led 
me to the conclusion that there is still a substantial gap in the literature, especially in the study 
of the public diplomacy of supranational actors. None of the publications on EU public 
diplomacy have fully explored the impact of the EU public diplomacy on the foreign policy 
preferences of the Ukrainian public. There is no available literature that would offer a 
comprehensive answer to my research questions. Thus, further research could be beneficial 
for the academic community and my thesis aims to reduce the gap in the IR literature on this 
topic. Below mentioned literature covers only parts of the complex issue of EU public 
diplomacy in Ukraine and will serve as a theoretical groundwork for my research.  
 
Chaban and Vernygora (2013) in their article “The EU in the Eyes of Ukrainian General 
Public: potential for EU public diplomacy?” identified several problems connected to the EU 
public diplomacy. The authors indicate that EU public diplomacy is “disjointed”, “under-
resourced” and “over-ambitious“ as it targets the public within and also outside its borders 
(Chaban and Vernygora, 2013, p.71).  After analysing the results of several surveys 
concerning perception of the EU in several aspects Chaban and Vernygora (2013, p.23)  
concluded that “While the EU-Ukraine official interactions are mired in contradictions and 
empty rhetoric, attentive listening to the Ukrainian general public reveals opportunities for 
both the EU and Ukraine.“ Authors advocate that the EU is relatively good in monologue; EU 
norms such as peace, democracy, human rights come across and attract Ukrainian people.  
However, EU performance is poor when it comes to dialogue and collaboration (Chaban and 
Vernygora, 2013).  
 
Preceding the break out of the turmoil in 2013 Dr. Lytvynenko delivered a speech under the 
auspices of the OSCE Talks. In this speech he focused on the importance of the topic dealing 
with the issue of competing foreign influences in Ukraine and their effect on the country´s 
stability and prosperity. He talked about the public diplomacy of several foreign players in the 
Ukraine including Russia, and the EU and pointed out the differences in the messages either 
of the actors are trying to send across to the Ukrainian public as well as variance in the 
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instruments and infrastructure employed to deliver these messages.  According to the author, 
the EU message focuses on the potential of the Ukrainian integration into the developed EU’s 
“heaven“ whose gates have already opened for other former socialist countries.  Russia on the 
other hand focuses on the projection of its power as well as their great history and cultural 
affiliation with Ukraine.   
 
One of the few comprehensive and up-to-date publications on EU public diplomacy is 
“European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work” edited by Cross and Melissen (2013). 
Through exploring all levels of the EU Public Diplomacy- subnational, national, 
transnational, and supranational it succeeded to partly fill the gap in the IR literature on the 
mechanisms behind EU soft power. Although, the publication does not sufficiently cover the 
topic of the impact of EU public diplomacy efforts in Ukraine, it offers an interesting insight 
into the EU public diplomacy in general. Chapter written by Cull was especially beneficial for 
this research. He facilitates analysis of public diplomacy by defining its constituent elements.  
 
“Foreign policy of the EU, assessing Europe´s role in the world” (2010) edited by F. Bindi, 
provides some relevant information, however it does not directly tackle the issue of the impact 
of EU public diplomacy on the foreign policy preference of the Ukrainian public.  Chapters 
by Casier, Giusti and Penkova helped me to comprehend the background of the ENP and 
complex EU-Ukraine relations as well as the importance of Russian influence on the outcome 
of the EU efforts in Ukraine.  
 
There is significantly more research conducted on the topic of public opinion. An analysis of 
public opinion is an indispensable component of any profound study of public diplomacy and 
its impact. Worcester, who dedicated his career to the research of public diplomacy and his 
contribution to the field of public opinion studies, is widely recognized. He claims that the 
formation of public opinion is influenced by “three levels of thought”- opinions, attitudes and 
values. He implies that each “level of thought” is formed differently and has a different 
impact on public opinion. His theory serves as a theoretical framework for one of my main 
hypothesis, which claims that different methods of public diplomacy have different effects on 
public opinion depending on which level of thought they are influencing. 
 
In this thesis I examine the influence of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian public opinion.  
Various scholars point out limits of examining public opinion formation. Davison (2007) 
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warns that public opinion formation is a very complex process influenced by a combination of 
many external factors and circumstances and therefore it is difficult to measure and predict it. 
With regard to the complexity of public opinion formation I study EU public diplomacy in 
Ukraine through seven different dimensions. I analyse seven principal methods that the EU 
employs to shape Ukrainian public perception and evaluate their influence. Giusti and 
Penkova (2010) recognized EU influence of Ukrainian public opinion, but at the same time 
they highlight Russian influence on Ukrainian public opinion. Even though this thesis is 
focused on EU public diplomacy, it does not omit Russian influence. The main issues tying 
Ukraine and Russia are outlined in this thesis.   
 
With regard to the fact that researched topic: the EU public diplomacy in Ukraine between 
2004 and 2014 is actual and dynamic, the research is aggravated by the lack of profound 
studies and comprehensive publications on this issue. Therefore, in this thesis I will use 
various scholarly articles, internet sources as well as primary sources: official reports, policies 
and public opinion surveys. 
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1 Theoretical Framework and Research Design 
 
1. 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to conduct systematic research it is crucial to define central terms- public diplomacy 
and public opinion. The notion of “public diplomacy” is dynamically defined. This dynamic is 
caused by the fact that scholars try to reflect the changing environment of international 
politics. There is no single, universal definition of public diplomacy and many existing 
definitions are incomplete or unclear.  Moreover, there is lack of agreement between scholars 
when specifying the actors of public diplomacy, the channels and instruments that can be used 
as well as the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. A. Gullion (1965), who coined the term 
“public diplomacy” defines public diplomacy as “the means by which governments, private 
groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments 
in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions.“ Gullion´s definition 
reflects how the term public diplomacy is understood in this thesis. This definition is also in 
line with the EU´s perception on public diplomacy. In a booklet published in 2007 by the 
European Commission, it is stated that “Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public 
attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing” 
(European Commission, 2007). “Public opinion” can be defined as “the collective view of a 
defined population“ (Worcester, 2013, p.1).   
 
It is widely recognised that Public Diplomacy has an impact on public perception, however 
the power of its influence depends on the way it is conducted. In this thesis I will analyse the 
impact of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian public perception in two dimensions. Firstly, I 
will analyse the effect of creating an institutionalized political framework for conducting 
public diplomacy on its efficiency and strength of its influence. Secondly, I will analyse the 
distinct influence of different methods of public diplomacy on public perception.  In order to 
examine the influence of public diplomacy on public perception it is necessary to look at the 
methods that actors of public diplomacy are using to influence a foreign public. In other 
words, it is crucial to define what public diplomacy consists of. According to Cull (2013) 
public diplomacy has five constituent elements- listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, 
exchange and international broadcasting.  Cull (2013, p. viii) states that “ The first and 
foundational way in which any international actor should engage a foreign public is by 
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listening to that public.” Listening enables an international actor to identify specific values 
and needs of a target public and adjust its public diplomacy accordingly, therefore listening is 
a prerequisite for efficient public diplomacy.  The second element of public diplomacy is 
advocacy. Advocacy is defined as “engaging foreign public through the explanation of 
policy” (Cull, 2013, p. viii). It is typically considered as the key element of public diplomacy. 
Explanation of policies raises awareness and helps shape opinions of a foreign public in the 
desired way.  The third method that actors use to engage a foreign public is cultural 
diplomacy. This method is based on the exchange of artistic, linguistic and other cultural 
forms. Principal aim of this method is to foster mutual understanding (Cull, 2003). The forth 
element is exchange-“engaging a foreign public by two-way exchange of persons” (Cull, 
2013, viii). Exchanges foster personal links between a domestic public and a foreign public 
and give individuals an opportunity to experience and understand life in another country. 
International broadcasting and information management includes broadcasting in third 
countries, promoting the international actor in national media of the third country and media 
monitoring. The media represents the main source of information for most of the public and 
their influence on their opinions is undisputable. With respect to the complexity of public 
opinion formation I endeavour to encompass all principal means by which the EU influenced 
the Ukrainian public, therefore besides five constituent mechanisms of public diplomacy 
presented by Cull (2013) I will also analyse EU´s financial aid and assistance in development 
and branding. Including these methods of influencing a foreign public is in line with Gullion´s 
definition of public diplomacy. EU policy towards Ukraine is to a large extent focused on 
financial aid and assistance in development, therefore it is an important aspect shaping their 
relations and it cannot be omitted. “Branding” is defined as “giving products and services an 
emotional dimension with which people can identify“(Ham, 2011, p.1). “Brand” is commonly 
defined as “a customer's idea about a product; the brand state comprises the outside world's 
ideas about a particular country“ (Ham, 2001, p.1). Term “ nation branding” was coined by 
Simon Anholt  in 1996. Academics also often employ terms “state branding“ or broader term 
“place branding“. I consider it important to include branding in the analysis because image 
building is directly linked to attractiveness. Furthermore, including branding provides me with 
an opportunity to include knowledge of PR and communication studies in my research. 
Gilboa (2008) argues that scholars and practitioners of international relations overlook 
relevant literature and knowledge of other social and behavioural sciences which leads to 
limited and incorrect findings.  By including branding into my analysis I aspire to partly solve 
this problem.  
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The seven elements of public diplomacy introduced above represent methods of public 
diplomacy. I will study the impact of EU public diplomacy in Ukraine through the lenses of 
these seven methods. Study of overall influence of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian 
perception is inseparable from studying distinct methods of EU public diplomacy. I argue that 
not only employing these methods is important for the final outcome, but also the way how 
they are employed matters. Moreover, different methods influence public opinion in different 
ways. Public diplomacy can be conducted with or without an institutionalized political 
framework. An institutionalized political framework increases visibility of public diplomacy 
and therefore has a better chance to reach the target public and influence its perceptions. At 
the same time, a political framework increases efficiency of conducting public diplomacy. In 
2004 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy that represents the political 
framework for policy towards EU neighbours and in 2009 it launched its Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) initiative that supplements ENP and is focused on eastern neighbours. In my first 
hypothesis I argue that conducting public diplomacy though institutionalized political 
frameworks such as ENP and EaP is likely to increase Ukrainian public support for the EU.  
 
Worcester claims that Public opinion is influenced by three “levels of thought”- opinions, 
attitudes and values. He advocates that in order to measure public opinion it is important to 
distinguish between their distinct influences on public opinion. He metaphorically defines 
“opinions” as “the ripples on the surface of the public’s consciousness, shallow, and easily 
changed”, attitudes are “the currents below the surface, deeper and stronger” and finally, 
values in his view represent “the deep tides of public mood slow to change, but powerful” 
(Worcester, 2013, p.11). As it is clear from the definition, opinions are very unstable and they 
can be easily manipulated, attitudes are firmer than opinions but can alter as a consequence of 
a new fact or event. Values are the most silent, but also the deepest and the most powerful. 
They are very stable and unlikely to change. It is almost impossible to transform them though 
propaganda or communication in a short term (Worcester, 2013). All three levels of public 
opinion defined by Worcester are extremely important to be considered when analysing 
public opinion polls and changes in public opinion. Worcester´s theory of formation of public 
opinion led me to my second hypothesis: I argue that whilst some of the seven defined 
methods of EU public diplomacy have a stable and gradual effect on the public opinion, 
others have a shorter but more noticeable impact. Specifically, mechanisms of public 
diplomacy that appeal to people’s values  have a more stable and gradual impact on the public 
opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less stable 
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but more visible effect on public opinion. For example, cultural, diplomacy and exchanges 
create common values and influence public opinion long term. Branding helps the EU to 
create and project a certain image. The EU has been projecting itself as symbol of stability, 
prosperity and democracy. These are values that attract Ukrainians steadily and therefore 
influence their attitudes over a longer period of time. Whilst methods of public diplomacy 
such as financial aid or development projects appeal to people’s opinions and attitudes and 
therefore they influence public opinion in a more visible but also less stable manner. After 
providing large financial aid to Ukraine its support for the EU is likely to significantly rise. 
However, this support is unstable and it is expected to drop after the development projects are 
ended and financial aid is exhausted.  
 
Many authors, such as Gilboa (2008), Cross and Melissen (2013) advocate that constructivism 
offers some interesting insights and promising prospects for studying public diplomacy.  
Constructivism emerged in the 1980´s as a critical reaction to neo- realism and neo-liberalism 
that are based on the assumption that the IR are shaped by the states´ pursuit of the power and 
wealth. Constructivism on the other hand emphasizes the “ideas” and claims that they “can 
transform organization of the world politics, shape the identities and interest of states and 
determine what counts as legitimate action.”(Baylis, Smith, Owens, 2011, p. 149). This theory 
studies the way in which the world is changed and shaped by the human actions. 
Constructivism gained significant support after the Cold War, when ideas and actions of the 
public led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. “Public diplomacy, like constructivism 
challenges the primacy of material power in achieving outcomes, and offers an alternative 
model of practice that understands the normative or ideational structures underpinning 
audience identities and gains influence by engaging through the shared understandings of this 
intersubjective dimension, including through social interaction and interplay.” (Byrne, 2012, 
p.3)  
 
1.2 Research Design 
 
In order to answer the research questions I will conduct a case study on EU public diplomacy 
in Ukraine in the 10-year time frame 2004-2014, thus from the time Ukraine became an EU 
neighbour on the 1st  of May 2004 until the 1st of May 2014, when this research was 
completed. Foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public are shaped by the nature of 
complex EU-Ukraine relations and overall attitudes of the Ukrainian public towards the EU. 
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Therefore the study of influence that EU public diplomacy had on the foreign policy 
preferences of the Ukrainian public is inseparable from the analysis of all major factors that 
influence relations between the two actors. To encompass the complexity of the impact of 
public diplomacy on public opinion, it is important to examine separate methods of public 
diplomacy and observe their distinct influence. With the regard to theories elaborated and 
explained in the previous section the methods of public diplomacy that will be analysed are 
listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media, 
branding and development aid. I will study changes in EU public diplomacy; I will examine 
how the creation of instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern 
Partnership translated into changes in the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public.  
I will study the impact of different public diplomacy mechanisms on the formation of 
opinions, attitudes and values of Ukrainians and I will examine how these “three levels of 
thought” influence public opinion.  
 
Data necessary for the analysis will be acquired by studying available literature on EU public 
diplomacy. I will also draw on information from the EU official website- europa.eu and 
analyse reports issued by EU institutions, Eurobulletins, Newsletters and official documents 
issued by the EU Delegation to Ukraine. I will scrutinize the official EU policies within the 
frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy and The Eastern Partnership. In addition, 
I will examine the public opinion polls conducted by the EU, Razmukov Centre and PEW 
Research Center conducted between 2004 and 2014.  In order to improve the “listening” 
capability of the EU and gain a better understanding of the specific challenges of individual 
ENP countries and ascertain how they view their neighbour, the EU launched The EU 
Neighbourhood Barometer project. Until this date, a comprehensive EU neighbourhood 
barometer survey in Ukraine was conducted only once- in 2012, on the sample, 1,000 
respondents used a method of face-to-face interviews. Furthermore, EuropeAid Directorate- 
General of the European Commission, launched project Opinion Polling and Research in the 
ENPI Countries and Territories (OPPOL). In 2009 and 2010, three polls in ENP countries 
were conducted within the OPPOL project. The surveys were focused on EU perception and 
EU awareness and were conducted on the basis of 110 interviews with opinion leaders in 
Ukraine. Since 2004 The Ukrainian Razumkov Centre has conducted several public opinion 
polls focused on Ukrainian perceptions of the EU. Each survey was conducted with a sample 
of  2 000 respondents. The American PEW Research Center carried out a survey in 2011 that 
involved 1 000 respondents. The most substantial part of my research will be based on the 
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Razmukov centre´s survey focused on foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. 
This survey was conducted repeatedly, in total twenty-seven times between 2002 and 2012 
and once in 2014. The respondents were asked a question: “Which foreign policy direction 
should be a priority for Ukraine?” On the basis of this data I will verify two main hypotheses 
introduced in the theory section and I will evaluate the EU neighbourhood policy.  
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2 EU- Ukraine Relations 
 
The following chapter is dedicated to the study of EU-Ukraine relations. The nature of their 
relations has a direct impact on Ukrainian public perception on the EU and it shapes their 
opinion on what foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine.  The chapter is 
divided into three sections. In the first one, I will introduce actors of EU public diplomacy, 
afterwards I will study the political and legal framework of the EU-Ukraine relations and in 
the last part I will analyse the strong external influence of Russia on EU- Ukraine relations.  
 
2.1 Actors and Institutions 
 
Before conducting research on the influence of EU public diplomacy it is crucial to define 
who conducts EU public diplomacy. According to Guillon´s definition, governments of states 
are not the only practitioners of public diplomacy. Besides governments of states, 
international organizations, corporations, interest groups or various types of individuals can 
also be involved in influencing a foreign public and therefore conduct public diplomacy. 
However, for the purpose of this research it is necessary to narrow down the relevant actors 
and institutions that will be analysed. I will primarily focus on the public diplomacy 
conducted by common EU institutions.  
 
Even though the common European project was launched more than a half century ago, the 
EU is still a developing actor and its institutions are transforming in time. A  Significant 
change in the actors that conduct EU public diplomacy was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
that entered into force in 2009. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the external service of the EU was 
often criticised for being fragmented. Public diplomacy was conducted by the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission. EU public diplomacy was focused on “infopolitik”, that 
means providing basic information about the Union though EU Information Centres across 
the world (Duke, 2013). One of the main goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to make the EU more 
visible and coherent. In the field of public diplomacy the Lisbon Treaty brought four major 
changes that influenced its conduct and efficiency. First of these changes was the creation of 
the new post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is 
a permanent chair of the Council of EU foreign ministers and, at the same time, a Vice-
President of the European Commission (VP). HR/VP represents a bridge between two major 
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EU institutions- the European Commission and the Council of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty 
provided legal grounds for the creation of the body that supports the work of the HR. This 
body is known as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and represents the second 
important change. As a response to the creation of EEAS, the institutions of the Commission 
responsible for foreign policy also transformed. External policy matters within the mandate of 
the European Commission are now managed by the new Directorate- General of the 
Commission - “The Service for Foreign Policy Instrument” (FPI). The third major change is 
represented by the official transformation of the European Council into an EU institution and 
creating the post of Council´s permanent president. Creation of the President of European 
Council and HR led to the fourth and final change, which was reducing the importance of the 
EU rotating presidency of the Council of the EU held for the period of six months by one of 
the member states by separating European Council and Council of the EU. The country 
holding the presidency is no longer chairing or leading the European Council and in the 
Council of the EU, the meetings of the misters of foreign affairs is now chaired by the HR. 
This transferred more of the leadership to the supranational level and decreased possibilities 
for shifts in foreign policy priorities every six months after the change of the presidency, thus 
enabled the EU to send more consistent message to its foreign partners (Cull, 2014).  
 
The important institution shaping EU-Ukraine relations and Ukrainian attitudes towards the 
EU is the diplomatic mission of the EU in Ukraine. The permanent delegation representing 
the interest of the EU in Ukraine was established in 1993 under the name “The Delegation of 
the European Commission to Ukraine”. In 2009, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU diplomatic 
mission was converted into the “Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine” (Delegation 
of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.).  
 
The official website of the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine enumerates four main 
responsibilities of the diplomatic mission, of which last two are directly linked to public 
diplomacy: 
• implementation of the EU development projects in Ukraine,  
• monitoring implementation of the EU-Ukraine agreements, 
• increase awareness  of the EU, its institutions and its programmes,  
• explain EU development and policies (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.). 
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Even though the Common Foreign and Security Policy has become more coherent over time 
and some powers have been transferred to the supranational level, the EU still remains an 
intergovernmental organization.  At the moment, EU member states retain decisive power and 
relative independence in the field of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, even though the 
Lisbon Treaty strengthened the links between different institutions responsible for the conduct 
of public diplomacy, the Treaty also created new actors that have to cooperate in the realm of 
foreign affairs, which can lead to problems with coordination. The overall external image of 
the EU remains fragmented on both the horizontal and vertical level (Cull, 2013). 
 
2.2 Political and Legal framework 
 
On the 1st of May 2004 ten, mostly eastern countries, joined the EU.  The 2004 enlargement 
was the largest single expansion of the EU and besides institutional and internal challenges it 
also entailed two external challenges for the new enlarged “European family”. Firstly, new 
eastern borders brought the EU closer to unstable areas and secondly, including some former 
communist countries, while excluding others encompassed the danger of creating new 
dividing lines which could have an adverse effect on the mobility of goods and persons 
between countries that joined the EU and their non-EU neighbours. These two fears led to the 
creation of a political framework which regulates the EU relations with its neighbours. In 
2002 the EU launched the “Wider Europe” policy, which later developed into the “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). At present, the European Neighbourhood Policy provides the 
political framework for bilateral cooperation between the EU and 16 neighbouring states. 
Since 2009, the ENP has been supplemented by three regional initiatives: the Eastern 
Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)  and the Black Sea Synergy.  
Relations with Ukraine are regulated under ENP´s eastern division- The Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) (EEAS b, n.d.). 
 
Through the ENP the EU commits to develop deeper political and economic cooperation built 
upon shared values, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market 
economy and sustainable development. In other words, the EU shapes its immediate vicinity 
in its own image by formulating conditions for the partner countries and providing financial, 
development and other incentives to comply with them. According to Casier (2010) the ENP 
to a certain extent represents shift in EU policy. In the past, the EU strived to enhance security 
and stability on the continent through enlargement, thus by “extending” its model of 
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democracy and stability. However, the EU started to experience “enlargement fatigue” and 
the ENP offered an alternative way to enhance security in the region by “exporting” its model 
of democracy and stability.   
 
With regard to the above mentioned and the ENP strategy paper issued by the Commission of 
the European Communities (2004), the main objectives of the ENP were security, stability, 
preventing the emergence of new dividing lines and naturally the EU´s economic and political 
interests. Consequently, it is not surprising that according to the EU’s official website, 
Ukraine is currently a “priority partner” within the European Neighbourhood Policy and its 
facet “Eastern Partnership” (EaP). Firstly, from the geopolitical point of view, Ukraine’s 
position on the West-East crossroad gives this former socialist state strategic importance for 
maintaining security and stability in the region. As recent developments proved, the 
competing influences make Ukraine prone to civil unrests which also affect the EU. Secondly, 
the 2004 enlargement placed barbed wire on the gates of all Ukraine western neighbours- 
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, which made Ukraine one of the countries potentially most 
effect by the “new diverging lines”. And finally, EU energy security is largely connected to 
Ukraine. It is the main transit country for the gas supplies from Russia to the EU.  
 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2007) developed three models to explain the export of  EU 
values and norms though the accession process. These models can also be applied to the ENP, 
they include the “external incentives model”, “social learning model” and “lesson-drawing 
model”. The first one is based on conditionality, which essentially is “reinforcement by 
reward”.  The conditions usually involve democratic reforms, openness and transparency of 
political and economic structures in the exchange of financial incentives or assistance in 
development. The new EU strategy “more for more” stipulates that countries that successfully 
comply with EU conditions will get more support. The second model is based on the 
“gravitational pull” that the EU exerts on its neighbours. According to this model a state 
accepts rules and norms if they are considered as legitimate or appropriate. The last model 
implies that disillusion with the domestic situation can be a driving force behind a state´s 
inclination to the “European solution”. In the case of Ukraine all of the three models are 
present to a certain extent. The EU has already provided its neighbour incentives worth 
billions of euros to motivate them to reform. Further, the statistics prove that Ukrainians 
perceive the EU as symbol of democracy, stability and prosperity and finally, according to EU 
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Barometer (2012) people are largely dissatisfied with the domestic status quo and believe that 
the EU has the potential to solve their problems.  
 
Since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, the EU and Ukraine have been gradually 
developing relations and cooperating. In 1998 the EU and post-soviet republic signed a 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which to the present day represents the core of the 
legal framework for their relations. After the 2004 enlargement, when Ukraine became an EU 
neighbour, both actors started to give higher priority to their relations and began to seek 
deeper cooperation. Consequently, in 2007 parties launched negotiations on a new 
Association Agreement. Negotiations were completed in 2011 and in 2012 the EU Foreign 
Affairs Council confirmed the Union´s determination to sign the Agreement as soon as 
Ukraine undertook actions to fulfil EU´s conditions focused mainly on institutional reforms 
toward a more democratic and transparent political and economic system. In 2013 President 
Yanukovych shelved plans to sign the new Agreement with the EU, which led to civil protests 
and the change of leadership. In 2014 the EU and Ukrainian interim government signed core 
provisions of the original agreement (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d). 
 
One year after Ukraine and the EU became neighbours, they endorsed the Action Plan, which 
entrenched their bilateral commitments and interest. The Action Plans are core elements of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy.  They set out an agenda for reforms of neighbouring 
countries in order to approximate more to EU standards and promote “common values”, the 
EU in return offers assistance in implementing these reforms and various political and 
economic concessions. As Ukraine and the EU started to seek deeper cooperation and 
negotiate a new Association Agreement, the Action Plan was, in 2009, replaced by EU-
Ukraine Association Agenda which was later in 2013 updated as a consequence of new 
developments. This agreement was designed to facilitate entry into force of Association 
Agreement and to prepare Ukraine for its implementation by democratizing its structures 
(EEAS a, n.d.). 
 
2.3 Russian Influence on EU-Ukraine Relations 
 
As mentioned above, the EU has the capacity to apply all three models of effective export of 
its norms and values in Ukraine, however, its position on the crossroads between the Russia 
and the EU, make the Ukrainian case sui generis.  The EU underestimated Russian influence 
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on the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his decision to suspend 
preparations to sign an agreement with the EU took many EU officials by surprise. It is 
impossible to examine EU-Ukraine relations without considering Russian influence in 
Ukraine. No less than 24 per cent of the Ukrainian population are Russian speakers, living 
mostly at the east and south of the country.  Furthermore, 17 per cent of the population are 
ethnic Russians (CIA, 2014). Since independence the country shifted its foreign policy 
direction several times. The west is largely pro-European, whilst east and south regions are 
pro-Russian.  
 
In 2010, Giusti and Peknova identified four main factors that tie Russia and Ukraine. The 
First one is economy. Ukraine used to be an essential part of soviet military industrial 
complex and ever since its independence Russia has been trying to maintain economic ties 
with the former soviet republic. Russia is the main exporter and importer of Ukraine. In 2012 
26 per cent of Ukrainian exports was destined to Russia and 32 per cent of Ukrainian imports 
originated in Russia. The EU as a whole is Ukraine’s second largest trading partner (CIA, 
2014). Russia tried to attract Ukraine to join the integration of former Soviet Republics- The 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Ukraine accepted only the status of 
“associate member” because the government was afraid it would harm its cooperation with 
the EU and hinder its admission to WTO which Ukraine joined in 2008. In 2014, following 
the annexation of Crimea Ukraine withdrew from the CIS completely. Ukraine´s membership 
in the WTO and Free Trade Area plans with the EU challenge Russian economic leadership in 
the post-soviet region (Giusti, Peknova, 2010). 
 
Another significant factor, which is often behind Russia- Ukraine disputes is gas. (Giustiy, 
Penkova, 2010, p.134). Ukraine’s energy security largely depends on Russia. Ukraine- Russia 
relations were strained by the disputes over the gas supplies several times over the last 
decades. Around 80 per cent of the gas supplies from Russia to the EU flow though Ukraine, 
which amount to approximately 20 per cent of all gas consumed in the EU.  Russia accused 
Ukraine several times for diverting gas flowing to the EU and using it for its domestic 
purposes. Ukraine was regularly unable to pay for its supplies from Russia on time and 
despite several agreements the frictions continued.  In April 2014 Ukraine’s overall debt to 
Russia for the supplies of natural gas reached over $3 billion (ITAR-TASS, 2014). In 
November 2013 the debt was lower but still significant and Russia threatened several times to 
cut off the supplies to Ukraine. Ukraine´s energy dependence and debt enabled Russia to exert 
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great political leverage.  Russia held Yanukovych in check and the energy issues certainly had 
an influence on foreign policy decisions of Ukrainian leaders. After the unrest that broke 
down in Ukraine last year the gas issue still plays a role. Russia announced an increase in the 
price of gas for Ukraine in order to push u and punish the former soviet state for its 
“infidelity”. The EU, in return pledged to frantically assist Ukraine in order to settle its 
obligations towards Russia (ITAR-TASS, 2014).  
 
The third important factor that ties Russia and Ukraine is security. Russia strives to maintain 
its influences and dominant power position if the region. Therefore when Ukraine applied for 
the membership in NATO, Russia perceived this step as a threat to its national security. If 
Ukraine entered the Alliance, Russia would find itself sharing a direct border with a third  
NATO member. Plans to join NATO were shelved after 2010 elections, when Yanukovych 
was elected. Furthermore, at present joining NATO doesn’t enjoy big poplar support (Giusti, 
Penkova, 2010). 
 
As a fourth factor influencing Ukraine- Russia relations the authors predictively defined the 
Crimea region. Already in 2010, Giusti and Penkova warned that strong Russian nationalism 
and aspirations of pro-Russian activists in the region to join Russia can pose a threat to 
Ukrainian sovereignty. The Crimean issue is connected to the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is 
operation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Sevastopol, the city in the south west of Crimean 
peninsula is the base for the Black Sea Fleet and has strategic importance for Russia.  
Ukrainian integration into western structures, especially NATO would not only threaten 
Russian control of its gas transit routes, but at the same time endanger the position of its naval 
forces, which have been present in the region since the 18th century.   
 
In addition to the four factors presented by Giusti and Penkova (2010), there are also strong 
cultural, historical and religious ties between Russia and Ukraine.  The EU should consider all 
dimensions of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle when developing its new strategy towards 
Ukraine. As recently proven, Russian influence in the region and particularly in Ukraine 
cannot be underestimated. It has a great impact on EU-Ukraine relations and does have an 
influence on EU-Russian relation. Following the turbulent development in Ukraine, the EU, in 
order to express support to the interim pro- western government in Kiev, decided to abandon 
its strict policy of conditionality. In March 2014 it signed core elements of the Association 
Agreement previously rejected by Yanukovych. After the direct involvement of Russia, Kiev 
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was looking up to the EU for help. The EU which is often criticised for being solely a soft 
power, found itself in a difficult situation. The EU decided to respond to Ukraine’s request for 
help though legally committing to trade concessions and generous financial assistance. The 
EU also imposed several economic sanctions on Russia. However, Russia is the third biggest 
trading partner of the EU and due to economic interdependence these sanctions are expected 
to have adverse effects also on the economies of the EU member states (Baker, Elgood, 
2014).  
 
In 2010, Giusti and Penkova stressed the importance of the awareness of Russian influence. 
They warned that in order to maintain stability in the region Russia should be included in 
“western solutions” to Ukrainian problems and western policies towards the region should 
take Russia´s interests and capabilities into account.  Today, four years after the publication of 
their recommendations we can assess that the west and the EU did not succeed to translate 
their recommendations into their policies and the current crisis is proving that their analysis 
was well founded. The authors conclude that weak ENP based principally on financial 
incentives and lacking in response to other needs of the “partner countries” is not having the 
desired effect on the foreign public nor their governments, but instead it is provoking Russia 
and exacerbating its “aggressive tone”.  Maybe the EU can draw a lesson for the future in 
order to make the ENP more efficient and successful in reaching its main strategic goal- 
stability at its gates. Furthermore, the EU remains primarily an economic integration and its 
CFSP is still weak.  Military conflict in its neighbourhood reveals the limitation of EU crisis 
management capabilities and certainly does not enhance EU soft power in the region. Peace 
and stability are one of the founding principles of the EU and promotion of the stability is in 
the EU´s vital interest. Therefore in order to avoid future escalation of tensions in the region, 
the EU has to take the interrelationships of the EU- Ukraine -Russia triangle into account 
when developing its strategies towards the eastern neighbourhood (Giustiy, Penkova, 2010,) 
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3 Constituent Elements of EU Public Diplomacy 
 
Public diplomacy can be conducted through various mechanisms. The academic society is not 
unified on the issue of constituent parts of public diplomacy and the boundaries of what 
constitutes public diplomacy are grey. For the purpose of this research I decided to analyse 
constituent parts of public diplomacy defined by Cull (2013) as listening, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media.  In addition, I will also examine 
EU branding and EU financial aid and assistance in development. I consider these seven 
elements the most relevant and influential in EU-Ukraine relations.  In this chapter I will 
analyse the EU’s capability to use each of these public diplomacy methods to engage with the 
Ukrainian public.  All of the mentioned elements shape EU-Ukrainian relations, influence 
attractiveness of the EU and consequently affect foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian 
public. In the last section of this chapter I will explain how public opinion is formed and 
changed and I will analyse how distinct elements of the EU public diplomacy differently 
influence formation of Ukrainian public opinion, depending whether they appeal to people´s 
values, attitudes or opinion. 
 
3.1 Listening  
 
Cross (2013), Chaban (2013), Vernygora (2013) and others also agree that effective public 
diplomacy cannot rely only on speaking but must also incorporate listening in order to adjust 
the message the actor wishes to send to the foreign public to specific needs and values of that 
public. Listening allows the practitioner of public diplomacy to craft policies that have a 
better chance to reach its strategic objectives. Neglecting listening can lead to 
misunderstanding and eventually to a counter-productive public diplomacy. Messages that 
proved effective in attracting one nation do not have to evoke the same effect when sent to 
another nation. Not every nation shares the same values and public diplomacy has to reflect 
cultural diversity and public diplomacy strategies have to be developed on a case by case 
basis.  
  
Listening must be systematic in order to be effective. The domestic situation of a target nation 
can change in time which can lead to a change in the priorities of its leaders and the public. 
Ukraine is a great example of these dynamics as after the crisis broke out the Ukraine´s 
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priority shifted form economic development to security and stability. It is of crucial 
importance to systematically observe the development in the target country and to be able to 
flexibly react to the changing priorities of the public. Many authors point out that despite the 
importance of listening, this constituent element of public diplomacy is often overlooked and 
undervalued by policy makers. The EU itself is often subjected to criticism for favouring 
monologue instead of dialogue. Casier (2010) claims that the ENP and cooperation 
agreements the EU signs with its neighbours within this political framework are too “EU 
centric”. He further notes that they are over focused on financial and development aid and do 
not tackle other needs and requests of the partner countries, such as visa facilitation in the 
case of Ukraine. He criticises that the partnerships within the ENP are asymmetric and 
recommends that the EU should undertake more effort to evaluate how the ENP is perceived 
by partner countries. I agree that listening is an essential part of effective public diplomacy 
which is to a certain extent neglected by the EU in its policies; however, in my opinion the 
asymmetry in the EU relations with its neighbours is an inevitable consequence of the large 
difference in the economic and political capacities between the EU and its “partners”.  The 
EU financially supports the development of its neighbours and if the EU would not ask for 
any quid pro quo, then the relationship would be truly asymmetric.  At the same time, the EU 
is not able to fulfil all the requests of the partner countries. Facing the domestic disagreement 
on the issue of immigration and enlargement fatigue, questions such as visa facilitation are 
very sensitive and the EU can make only limited concessions in this regard.  
 
Another critic of the EU’s ability to “listen” is the Ukrainian public. The EU Neighbourhood 
Barometer survey from 2012 proves that the EU fails to listen to the Ukrainian nation. 40 per 
cent of respondents agreed that “Communication from the EU does not take into account the 
reality of life in Ukraine”, whilst only 29 per cent think the opposite. On the other hand, the 
EU significantly improved in listening to the Ukrainian public in the recent years. In 2012 the 
EU conducted its first comprehensive public opinion polls aimed at detecting Ukrainian 
domestic problems, their attitudes towards the EU and their awareness of the EU (EU 
neighbourhood Barometer, 2012).  In addition, the EU recently launched the ENPI Regional 
Communication Programme that encompasses opinion poling, media monitoring, social 
media monitoring in ENP countries. Furthermore, The Directorate–General for Development 
and Cooperation – EuropeAid carried out three surveys in ENP countries between 2009 and 
2010.  This initiative was running under the name “Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI 
Countries and Territories” (OPPOL) (European Commsion, 2013). Better Listening is also 
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assured by the establishment of common EU-Ukrainian institutions. In the Co-operation 
Council, Co-operation Committee and Parliamentary Co-operation committee, representatives 
from the Ukrainian government and experts form both partners meet and discuss the 
implementation of the agreements and main issues of cooperation.  Furthermore, there is an 
annual summit held between Ukrainian president and resident of the European Council and 
European Commission. (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d) 
 
3.2 Advocacy 
 
There are many channels that an actor can use to reach a foreign public in order to raise 
awareness and knowledge of the actor and its policies. The EU advocates its policies mainly 
through its website, through the EU Information Centres and EU delegations. 
 
Ukraine is a relatively closed country; barely 32 per cent of Ukrainians own a valid passport 
for travelling abroad. Between 2008 and 2013 only 12 per cent of Ukrainians visited the EU 
(Lytvynenko, 2013).  For this reason the work of the EU Delegation in Ukraine, as well as 
their activity online; represent the key channels to reach the Ukrainian public. The EU 
delegation in Kiev promotes European values in Ukraine though various channels, giving the 
most emphasize to “Euroclubs“. They were set up in Ukraine in 1995. Euroclubs aim to 
increase awareness of the EU, support for the EU by informing the Ukrainian population 
about the Union and benefits of the EU-Ukraine cooperation. Euroclubs in Ukraine are 
focused primarily on school children and youth. Moreover, the EU delegation regularly 
publishes Newsletters, Eurobulletins and EU Co-operation news, highlighting key events of 
the EU-Ukraine cooperation.  All Newsletters and Eurobulletins are issued in Ukrainian. This 
is a logical move since only a small percentage of Ukrainians speaks English. EU Co-
operation news is published in English. Between 2008 and 2014, the EU delegation developed 
nearly 300 Newsletters and more than 100 Euroebulletins. They encompass economic and 
political matters, as well as the social and cultural dimension of the cooperation (Delegation 
of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.). 
 
Another, important channel of EU advocacy is the EU official website- europa.eu. It provides 
detailed info about the EU and every aspect of its work. In addition, the EU has several 
specialized online info centres, including an online EU Neighbourhood Info Centre that was 
launched in 2009. The EU structure and processes of its work are very complex; therefore it is 
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important to pass the information to public in a very clear and simplified way. The EU is 
notoriously known for often failing in this task and for many, even EU citizens, the EU comes 
across as “confusing”.  The EU is an intergovernmental organization and completely unified 
image is not possible at this stage of its integration. Understanding the mosaic of 28 member 
states is difficult itself,  yet the EU supranational institutions confuse the external observers 
even more by failing to project a unified message at the horizontal level of EU governance. 
The public has to find different pieces of information on different websites. For example, 
there are at least three official websites run by the EU informing the public about the EaP. 
The complex picture has to be extracted from several sections on the official website of the 
EU- Europe.eu, secondly from the official website of the EU neighbourhood Info Centre- 
enpi-ingo.eu, but also from its own website easternpartnership.org. Some of the information 
on different websites are complementing each other, whilst others are rather tautological, 
which creates a confusing overall picture. The results of public opinion polls in Ukraine in 
2012 underpin this claim.  Only 41 per cent of Ukrainians think that communication from the 
EU about Ukraine is easy to understand1 (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). The survey 
made by Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territories in 2009 also 
proves that the EU failed to explain the complexity of the EU and its institutions in many 
aspects. Random respondents were given a basic knowledge test about the EU. Only 39 per 
cent of Ukrainians knew how many member states the EU consisted of. Only 41 per cent were 
aware that European Investment Bank (EIB) is an EU institution, but striking 62 per cent 
thought that UNICEF is (OPPOL, 2009). Another problem is that even though the 
information the EU provides often do not effectively reach the Ukrainian public.  Even though 
the EU yearly invests millions of euros on raising awareness of the EU, 48 per cent per cent of 
the Ukrainians think that there is not enough information on the EU available, and only 40 per 
cent think that there is sufficient level of information about the EU2 (EU Neighbourhood 
Baromenter 2012). The EU has to endeavour not only to speak but also to be heard and 
understood. This chapter demonstrates that the information reaching the Ukrainian public is 
not sufficient and is not easy to understand.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See chart 2, p.44 
2 Ibid. 
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3.3 Cultural Diplomacy 
 
Another method how to attract the foreign public and develop attitudes towards the EU is 
subsidizing cultural exports and cultural cooperation. Many scholars consider cultural 
diplomacy to be an independent field of diplomacy, whilst others considered it to be part of  
public diplomacy. US department of state Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy in its 
report form 2005 labels cultural diplomacy as “a linchpin of public diplomacy” (US 
Department of State, 2005). 
 
One of the main cultural events organized by the EU in Ukraine is the European village, 
annually held in Kiev. The European Village visitors receive information on the EU, its 
history and its cooperation with Ukraine. Along with the informative part, the European 
village includes sport and cultural events, such as football matches and music concerts. The 
European village is organized by the EU delegation to Ukraine with cooperation with EU 
member states, Kiev city administration and the Ukrainian government.  In  2007, when the 
EU celebrated its 50th anniversary, marking 50 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, 
nearly 60 000 people visited the European village in Kiev and reports of the event were 
broadcasted on national TV and published in the newspapers (European Commission, 2007). 
 
Whilst the European village is targeted for Ukraine, Europe Day is a cultural event that fosters 
unity across Europe.  In principle, there are two Europe Days. On the 5th of May Europe 
celebrates the establishment of the Council of Europe and on the 9th of May Europeans 
remember the Schuman Declaration that is perceived to be the funding text of European 
integration. In Ukraine, Europe Day is celebrated during the third weekend in May. Europe 
Day celebrations were established in Ukraine in 1993. During this weekend numerous cultural 
events are organized across the country.  Ukrainians can taste food from across Europe and 
enjoy performances from European musicians and artists (EU, n. d.). According to the 
Razmukov centre, around 60 per cent of Ukrainians do not consider themselves as Europeans, 
thus events that promote European unity are a vital part of EU public diplomacy efforts in 
Ukraine.  
An important part of culture is language. The EU has 24 official languages, with the most 
common communication language and lingua franca being English. Languages play an 
essential role in enhancing unity and understanding. Knowledge of the same languages is a 
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prerequisite for an effective communication between people. European languages in Ukraine 
are promoted mainly by EU member states and their language agencies. Allians Française has 
its office in ten cities across the Ukraine, the British Council is represented in four cities and 
the Goethe Institute also has its office in Kiev. The EU on the central level is lacking in this 
regard. The fact that Ukraine has the lowest English language learning rate in Eastern Europe 
signals that the lack of effort of the EU on the central level is consequential. Velychenko 
(2006) points out that English is the second foreign language In Ukraine after Russian. A 
common history and presence of significant Russian minority in Ukraine are not the only 
reasons for this.  Russia is actively engaged in promoting Russian in Ukraine. There are many 
Russian language schools present in Ukraine. In addition, many of the specialized books at 
Ukrainian schools and universities are available only in Russian. At the same time, learning 
English is for many Ukrainians perceived as a not commonly available luxury (Velychenko, 
2006).  
Poland and Germany are one of the loudest and active advocates of strengthened cooperation 
with EU´s eastern neighbours. Poland and Germany play an important role in organizing the 
European Village project in Kiev. They are also active in another aspects of cultural 
diplomacy, for example Ministry of for affairs of Poland recently coo-financed the Eastern 
Partnership – Perspectives of Cultural Diplomacy Conference  in Kraków, in order to “to 
initiate a discussion on prospects of development of the Eastern Partnership and set new goals 
in the context of Cultural Diplomacy” (EastBook, 2013). 
In this chapter I pointed out the importance of an active cultural diplomacy in Ukraine. The 
majority of Ukrainians do not feel culturally attached to Europe and therefore projects such as 
the European Village and Europe Day, which strive to promote European Unity and stimulate 
feeling of European identity amongst Ukrainians, are important tools of public diplomacy. 
However, the EU fails in promoting European languages in Ukraine and without an effort in 
this regard the gap between Ukrainian society and the EU public cannot be diminished. 
Furthermore, due to strong Russian endeavour to promote Russian in Ukraine, the EU passive 
stance can be dangerous.  
 
3.4 Exchange  
 
The fourth element of public diplomacy that enhances mutual understanding and personal 
connections between EU citizens and citizens of third countries is exchange. According to 
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Scott-Smith (2008, p.174) exchange programs are ”oft-neglected but arguably most successful 
element of public diplomacy, from the perspective of diplomatic history and international 
relations.“  
 
The EU exchanges of people with third parties, including Ukraine, are mainly focused on 
students, education staff through Erasmus + and government officials, NGO´s , journalists  
and other professionals through European Union Visitors Programme. Youth from the EU and 
third countries can also join the European Voluntary Service. 
 
In 2004, The EU launched the Erasmus Mundus mobility programme. The EU has been 
exchanging students and academic staff with third countries in order to deepen cooperation in 
the field of education, improve the quality of European education, promote the EU as a centre 
of excellence and bolster intercultural understanding. In 2014, the EU introduced a new 
programme called Erasmus + that absorbed all EU schemes for education including Erasmus 
Mundus. The new programme also offers the possibility for grants for development of joint 
master courses between Ukrainian and EU universities. Besides education and training, 
Erasmus + is focused also on sport (EACEA, 2014). The budget for Erasmus + for the period 
2014-2020 is 14.7 billion euro, which represents a 40 per cent increase compared to previous 
years (European Commission, 2014b). According to the EU official website more than 4000 
Ukrainians are expected to receive grants to participate in Erasmus + 2014-2020 university 
exchange programme (European Commission, 2014c). Furthermore, the website of the EU 
Delegation to Ukraine and European Commission offer information about other possibilities 
to study in Europe.  
Ukrainian citizens between 17 and 30 can also participate in the exchange though European 
Voluntary Service (EVS). EVS project is based on cooperation between organisations in the 
EU and third countries. Participants can apply for posts that can last from 2 weeks up to 12 
months in a wide range of fields, ranging from culture, sport, education, environment, 
economic development, cooperation etc. Even though it is volunteer projects, the participants 
are provided with an accommodation, food and pocket money, thus most of their living costs 
are covered, which makes participation in this program relatively accessible.  The current 
budget presumes that more than 7000 Ukrainians will be able to gain a practical experience in 
the EU through EVS initiative or through funding for the mobility of youth workers 
(European Commission, 2014c). 
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The EU Visitors Programme has been a joint initiative of the European Parliament and 
European Commission since 1974. Every year, the EU invites professionals from the third 
countries, including Ukraine for five to eight days to EU institutions to gain knowledge of the 
EU, its policies, and meet professionals from the EU. The EU Visitors Programme is 
according to the website of the EU Delegation to Ukraine open for “government officials, 
journalists, trade unionists, educators, non-governmental organisations and other professionals 
with career-related interests in the European Union.” Only five to six professionals are 
selected from Ukraine each year (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, 2011). 
Erasmus +, European Voluntary Service and EU Visitors Programme represent important 
initiatives that facilitate exchange between EU citizens and Ukrainians. The highest number 
of Ukrainians have a chance to come to the EU for an exchange through Erasmus programme. 
The EU is gradually developing and extending this programme. However, the number of 
exchanges between EU citizens and Ukrainians is still low. For illustration, In the single 
academic year- 2007/2008, the Erasmus program enabled around 210 000 EU students and 
academics from the EU to participate in exchange within the EU, while only 800 students, 
teachers and researchers from Ukraine, which has population over 44 million people, received 
Erasmus Mundus scholarships between 2007 and 2011 (EU, 2009). Even after a 40 per cent 
budget increase for the Erasmus Mundus only around 1 800 Ukrainians a year will have a 
chance to participate in the exchange through Erasmus+, European Voluntary Service and EU 
Visitors Programme combined.  Changes and reforms in the exchange programs represent a 
step forward; however this method of public diplomacy is still under-used.  
 
3.5 International Broadcasting and Media 
 
The development of international broadcasting corporations that are able to reach the public in 
more countries at the same time as well as endeavour to be presented in the national media of 
third countries have been important parts of foreign policy strategies since the technical 
developments allowed it. European states have been pioneers in engaging with the public of 
third countries though government support of international broadcasting corporations since 
the 1920s (Cull, 2013). The new information has era brought new possibilities for reaching a 
foreign public. Besides traditional channels as newspapers and TV, new channels, such as the 
internet and social media, have emerged. The information has become more accessible and 
harder to control and subject to censorship. At present, governments are including social 
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networks more and more in their public diplomacy strategies. Also the EU´s ENPI Regional 
Communication Programme is focused also on social media monitoring along with media 
monitoring. 
 
Assuring that the EU appears in the national medias of third countries is the responsibility of  
the 139 EU Delegations around the world that are actively cooperating with media in the host 
countries. Their work, according to the website of the European Commission involves:  
• co-funding or co-producing documentaries and radio shows; 
• providing information for radio quizzes and games and offering prizes; 
• finding speakers for panel discussions; 
• arranging for interviews by the head of delegation; 
• placing adverts in the written press; 
• producing TV spots; 
• co-financing press supplements; 
• holding round-table debates with the press; 
• providing articles ready for publication. (Europan Comission, 2007) 
  
The Delegation of the EU to Ukraine has the Press and Information Section which is raising 
awareness of the EU through various information activities. These activities include 
administrating the official website of the delegation, Newsletters, Eurobulletins, EU-Ukraine 
Cooperation Newsletter , brochures, audio-visual products, press conferences, seminars and 
press releases about EU events.  Besides English sources of information, EU Delegation also 
provides publications in Ukrainian and Russian  (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.). 
 
The EU is less active when it comes to support of European international broadcasting 
corporations in Ukraine.  In 1993, The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) established its 
radio broadcast in Ukraine, called “BBC Ukrainian”.  BBC Ukrainian broadcasted in 
Ukrainian, bringing domestic and international news. BBC Ukrainian radio broadcasting was 
directed from their headquarter in London, with cooperation with the office in Kiev.  
Nevertheless, since 2011 BBC Ukrainian exists only online. Lytvinenko (2013, p.4) observes 
that “As a direct source of information, European media are not particularly important in 
terms of influencing Ukrainian public opinion. However, the BBC, CNN, and others are the 
most essential sources of international information for the Ukrainian media and elites.” 
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Limited influence of BBC, TV5Monde, Deutsche Welle and other European broadcasting 
networks correlates with the small amount of Ukrainians speaking English, French, German 
or other major EU languages.  In order to use the full potential of this public diplomacy tool it 
is first necessary to promote learning European languages in Ukraine.  
 
In contrast, Russia is very successful in broadcasting in its language in Ukraine. In 2012, the 
Ukrainian newspaper Pravda even published an article about “russification” though TV and 
radio. According to statistics they published more than 60 per cent of the total circulation of 
newspapers are in Russian. Furthermore, 83 per cent of magazines and about 87 per cent of 
books are published in Russian. The popular news network reveals that only 28 per cent of 
TV programs in Ukraine are in Ukrainian, whilst 44 per cent are in Russian and 28 per cent 
are bilingual (Pravda, 2012). 
 
In recent years the EU has extended its cooperation with the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU), which is a union of public service broadcasters in and around Europe. The EBU was 
launched in 1950 by 23 broadcasters from Europe and today it has 76 members from 56 
countries. The EBU founded the Eurovision Song contest project that is widely known in 
Europe. It also initiated the Euronews channel which broadcasts news from a pan-european 
perspective in 155 countries around the world. In 2012, the EU and EBU signed the 2012 
Memorandum of Understanding. In this document the EU and EBU committed to cooperate 
in supporting the development of sustainable and independent public service media serving 
the democratic society in the EU neighbourhood. In 2013 the EU announced that it plans to 
deepen cooperation with the EBU (EU Press Relaease Database, 2013). The EBU plays an 
important role in promoting EU values and culture, influences opinion of millions of people 
around the world though the Euronews channel brings European nations including Ukraine 
together thanks to initiatives like the Eurovision song contest and it supports the independence 
of information. Considering that the EU lacks its own broadcasting initiative, it is crucially 
important that the Union closely cooperates with the EBU. 
 
3.6 Branding 
 
In the Globalisation and information era, image and branding have become important foreign 
policy tools. Actors without strong brands have difficulties to attract economic and political 
attention. Branding has been affecting political reality of states, as well as of subnational and 
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supranational actors, such as the EU (Ham, 2001). In the last decade several opinion leaders, 
started to measure the image of places. The most influential are Anholt- GfK Roper Nation 
Brands Index measuring global perceptions of countries and cities across several dimensions 
and the international ranking of soft power conducted by Monocle in cooperation with The 
Institute for Government.  
 
Branding has sparked fierce academic discussion over the past decade and has many 
proponents and critiques. Ham (2001) views place branding positively. He believes that 
branding represents a more benign alternative to nationalism. Branding techniques used to 
form an image and strengthen national identity are in his opinion surpassing aggressive and 
dangerous techniques of nationalism and contributing to peace and tolerance. Many realists, 
on the other hand, diminish the real influence of branding. Their claim is built on the premise 
that all political actors, including a politically engaged public are rational and make their 
decisions on the basis of strategic calculations.  But, as Ham (2001) points out the processes 
of world politics are far more complex. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that people, who 
are provably influenced by branding and image in their everyday choices when buying 
consumer products, would decide solely on the basis of rational analysis when making 
political decisions. Also public opinion experts such as Davison (2007) agree that opinion 
leaders can influence public opinion by inventing slogans and symbols. “Once enunciated, 
symbols and slogans are frequently kept alive and communicated to large audiences by the 
mass media and may become the cornerstone of public opinion on any given issue” (Davison, 
2007, p. 8). 
 
Place branding is practiced within the EU on several levels; EU as a whole, member states, 
region and even cities are trying to engage external audiences by creating an attractive image.  
Well known symbols that externally represent the EU are its flag, motto and anthem. The 
Omnipresent blue flag with twelve starts in a circle is the most recognized EU symbol. The 
EU flag even further inspired flags of other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, where the EU was largely involved on their way “to stability and independence”.   
Due to the successful integration of the post war continent and pioneering in human rights and 
sustainable development, the EU is perceived as symbol of democracy, prosperity and 
stability. Furthermore, thanks to its history, worldwide known events and educational system, 
the EU is often perceived as a centre of excellence and culture. On the other hand, the EU is 
also associated with certain negative attributes and many of its achievements are disregarded. 
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In addition, according to Gallup International (2005) over 36 per cent of the world does not 
have an opinion on the EU and views it as “neutral”. Ham (2001), Cull (2013), Cross (2013) 
and others claim that The EU is selling itself short and that there is a significant gap between 
EU´s image and its importance and achievements. One of the examples of this is little 
knowledge of the world about the EU’s outstanding efforts and achievements in humanitarian 
aid, which I outlined in the introduction. 
 
The EU is most often criticized for being incoherent and unclear. Especially, in the field of 
CFSP the EU as a whole is often exposed to criticism for being disjointed, slow and weak in 
its response. As Helwing (2013) points out, this criticism could be attributed to a large 
“capability-expectations“ gap. Bonfield (2012) claims that the HR is "all hat and no cattle". 
Often too ambitious and misleading speeches by the HR and other EU officials make the 
public and international partners believe that Europe has found its single voice that can unite 
and replace all 28 previously existing ones. Even though Lisbon brought more powers to the 
supranational level, the last word remains with member states and CFSP remains prevailingly 
intergovernmental. An example of misleading speech setting faulty expectations was HR´s 
speech in Brussels in 2009: “Our security and defence policy is now a reality, and our 
capacity in the area of crisis-management is making a real difference on the ground.   There is 
much to be proud of where there was only a common will ten years ago.  We do not just make 
declarations, we act to monitor, to protect and to stabilise with concrete results“ (Ashton, 
2009).  The “capability- expectations gap” can result in disenchantment and negatively 
influence how the EU is perceived both inside and outside its borders. The problem is relevant 
also in the case of Ukrainian perceptions of the EU as over ambitious statements can cause 
Ukrainians scourged by unrests to expect the EU to help more than just with its diplomacy 
and economic sanctions. Overall, the EU in the field of CFSP, with regards to its powers and 
instruments at its disposal, proved a better peace mediator and manager of civilian assistance 
than crisis manager. Therefore, it could be beneficial if the EU officials focused on these 
capabilities of the EU in their official speeches. The EU should highlight its strengths, without 
deepening “capability-expectations gap”. As the GfK research institute states in its 
publication  “Place Branding encompasses measuring (…) identity,  evaluating its strengths 
and weaknesses and building and communicating differentiating  and winning characteristics” 
(GfK, n.d.). 
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Cull (2013) indicates that EU diversity that is today often associated with “incoherence” 
doesn’t have to be necessarily negative. The EU should, in the spirit of its motto, endeavour to 
stress the benefits of its diversity. He reminds us that military strengths and “coherence” 
invoke hegemony and fear and can produce negative attitudes.  “The optimal solution for the 
EU is to be seen as a glorious mosaic of 500 world-class cities or 250 regions or 28 member 
states rather than one blue and god-starred leviathan, and yet have the central authority to 
truly benefit all the parts” (Cull, 2013, p.xii). 
 
Above, I expressed claims that the EU is successful in promoting its symbols, especially its 
flag, and projecting its fundamental values, but also that the EU is at the same time perceived 
as incoherent and unclear. These claims are confirmed by results of public opinion research 
on the Ukrainian perception of the EU conducted by OPPOL in 2009. “The vision of the EU 
is based mainly on stereotypes like democracy and economic growth and development and 
some symbols like flag with stars and the euro. (…) The image of the EU is quite positive but 
unclear” (OPPOL, 2009).  For 44 per cent of Ukrainians the EU conjures up a positive image, 
for 37 percent neutral, for only 10 per cent negative3 (EU Barometer, 2012).  Most Ukrainians 
do not know or do not understand the EU´s structure and workings.  Despite the fact that 
according to an OPPOL survey only 39 per cent of Ukrainians knew the correct number of 
EU member states, 93 per cent of them recognized the EU flag (OPPOL, 2009). The flag that 
the EU currently uses to represent itself was originally the flag of a different organization- the 
Council of Europe. The Council of Europe invited other European institutions to adopt the 
flag to symbolize Europe´s unity. Consequently, the European Economic Community, which 
was the precursor to the EU, adopted the flag in 1980´s. At present, due to the EU´s higher 
political profile and frequent use of this symbol, the flag is more often associated with the EU 
than with the Council of Europe. However, the fact that the EU and Council of Europe share 
the same flag and anthem could be one of the reasons why 55 per cent of Ukrainians think 
that council of Europe is an institution of the EU (OPPOL, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the EU is often connected to certain exclusivity.  States that want to join the EU 
have to withstand a long accession process and fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Therefore EU 
membership represents a certain affirmation of stability and development and symbolizes a 
certain “status and place in the intentional community” (Ham, 2001).  However, the 
                                                 
3 See chart 3, p.45 
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exclusivity can also backfire. Due to the long list of conditions that candidate countries have 
to fulfil before they can join the Union, many Ukrainians perceive the EU as a “distant 
dreamland” and some scholars describe the EU as a “gated community”.  Event though, the 
EU within ENP presumes to cooperate with partner countries without integrating them into 
the Union, the accession to the EU is part of the national strategy of Ukraine.  
 
To conclude, the EU enjoys a relatively positive image in Ukraine, however it has to 
endeavour to gain the “hearts and minds” also of 37 per cent of Ukrainians that do not have an 
opinion about the EU and alter the perceptions of 10 per cent that view the EU negatively. 
One of the ways to achieve this is by projecting a clearer image and promoting understanding 
of EU institutions and workings. Furthermore, in order to avoid disenchantment and a 
negative image the EU should strive to decrease the current “capabilities- expectations gap”. 
In order to take attention away from its incoherent and relatively weak CFSP it should stress 
its abilities and achievements as a mediator. The EU´s diversity is currently often associated 
with a lack of coordination and incoherence; however the EU can shift this negative 
perception by emphasizing positive sides of its heterogeneity. And finally, I demonstrated that 
there is a gap between EU image and its importance in the world politics, therefore it is 
crucial that the EU promotes more its achievements and take credit for its accomplishments.   
  
3.7 Financial aid and assistance in development  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the “European Neighbourhood Policy” and “Eastern 
Partnership” represent the main political frameworks for the regulation of EU- Ukraine 
relations. Even though the EU collaborates with more countries though these platforms, 
Ukraine is recognized as a “priority” or a “key” partner.  
 
Decisions made within the ENP and EaP were implemented though a financial instrument- 
“The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument” (ENPI). ENPI was launched in 
2007 and in 2014 it was replaced by the “European Neighbourhood Instrument“(ENI). 
Another important financial instrument to gather and provide resources for financing projects 
agreed upon within ENP is the “Neighbourhood Investment Facility” (NIF). NIF brings 
together grants from the EU Commission, voluntary donations from EU member states and 
loans from European Public Finance Institutions. Between 2007 and 2013 NIF contributed € 
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745 million to development projects in neighbouring countries (EU Neighbourhood Info 
centre, n. d.).  
 
Development aid is a key instrument within ENP.  In 2007-2013, the EU provided partners 
with over € 12 billion in grant money for the implementation of ENP projects (EU 
Neighbourhood Info centre, n. d.).  Regarding Ukraine, the EU as a whole is the largest donor 
to this eastern neighbour. Since its independence, EU support to Ukraine has exceeded € 2.5 
billion.  Moreover, the annual support for Ukraine is increasing. Whilst in 2002 the EU 
invested € 47 million, in 2009 the figures more than doubled and reached € 116 million 
(EEAS a, n.d.). 
 
After the crisis in Ukraine broke out, the EU Commission, in order to demonstrate its support 
for Ukraine, released a document named “Support Package for Ukraine”. In this document the 
EU pledges to provide Ukraine overall support of a tremendous €11 billion over the upcoming 
years from the EU budget and EU based international financial institutions” (European 
Commission, 2014). Besides macro financial assistance, assistance in reconstruction and 
development, trade concessions and visa liberation, the core element of the support package is 
also assistance in the energy security sector, which is an important issue in Ukraine. The EU 
further commits to assist in stabilising the country (European Commission, 2014).  This is 
likely to appeal to Ukrainians. A public opinion poll conducted in Ukraine by Razmukov 
Center in 2014 reveals that security is currently perceived as one of the most important areas 
of cooperation with the EU. 
 
The EU is currently funding more than 250 distinct projects across Ukraine. EU development 
programmes are targeting a wide range of sectors, with focus on fostering democratic reforms, 
administrative capacity building, infrastructure development and energy security (EEAS a, 
n.d.). The EU donated vast amount of subsidies to Ukraine through ENP and EaP. Lot of EU 
projects directly reached ordinary people, which beyond doubt helped to enhance positive 
attitudes towards the EU.  ENP was launched in 2004 and EaP in 2009, both times the support 
for the EU was significantly increased4. The EU Neighbourhood Barometer conducted in 
Ukraine in 2012 reveals that 40 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the EU is the most capable 
actor to help economic development in their country. In other words, 40 per cent of 
                                                 
4 See chart 1.A, p. 42 
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Ukrainians believe that the EU is more capable of fostering the economic growth of Ukraine 
than their own national government or Russia. According to polls national government had 
the trust of 44 per cent while CIS countries, including Russia, only 14 per cent. However, the 
same survey revealed that 76 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the EU should have a greater 
role to play in the economic development of their country. Only 40 per cent of the Ukrainian 
public agree that the support of the EU currently contributes a lot to the development of 
Ukraine. Ukraine over the past years received the highest support, yet the average result from 
other EaP countries was one percent higher (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). An 
OPPOL research (2009, p. 19) confirms that “Compared with other international players in 
Ukraine, the EU is considered as one of the contributors in economic matters only after the 
International Financing institutions (IMF/WB, EIB/EBRD).” These mixed results imply that 
even though many Ukrainians are aware of the great economic power of the Union and are 
attracted by its development projects and its capacity to help Ukraine to develop in the future, 
a significant part of the population is not aware of the extent of help that is currently flowing 
to Ukraine. As I mentioned above the EU is the largest donor to Ukraine and since its 
independence the support for Ukraine has reached over € 2.5 billion. These figures are 
tremendous, therefore, mixed recognitions of EU efforts seem surprising. It is clear that the 
EU is lacking in promoting its financial aid. Economic development is one of the priority 
areas where Ukrainians would like to see greater involvement of the EU, thus the EU can 
improve its image in Ukraine by rising awareness of EU development aid. It is a logical 
premise that financial support would improve attitudes towards Europe and the opinion polls 
prove it5. After the launch of the ENP and EaP the support raised.  Conducting public 
diplomacy through an institutionalized political framework increases its visibility and 
therefore has a better chance of influencing awareness and attitudes. The results of an OPPOL 
survey (2009) proves that ENP and EaP make EU development aid to Ukraine more visible 
and help the EU take credit for its efforts. According to the survey 95 per cent of Ukrainians 
have knowledge of ENP and EaP initiatives. However, they still lack information about the 
extent of the aid that Ukraine receives though these initiatives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See chart 1.A, p. 42 
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3.8 Public Opinion Formation   
 
Public opinion is increasingly influential in IR. Public protests that led to a change of 
government in Ukraine are one of many reminders that public opinion matters. In order to 
study how public opinion can be effectively used as a part of foreign policy strategies, it is 
important to understand what public opinion is, how it is formed and how can different 
methods of public diplomacy influence it.  My second hypothesis claims that  mechanisms of 
public diplomacy that appeal to people’s values have a stable and gradual impact on public 
opinion, whilst mechanisms that through certain events directly influence the reality of a 
foreign audience and influence their attitudes and opinions have a less stable but more 
noticeable effect on public opinion. This hypothesis is built upon the study of the Past 
President of the World Association of Public Opinion Research Sir Robert Worcester (2013). 
He claims that public opinion consists and is influenced by three “levels of thought”; values, 
attitudes and opinions.  As elaborated in the theory section, opinions are the most unstable and 
easy to influence, attitudes represent more firm beliefs that are harder to confound and values 
are the most stable “deep and powerful tides” (Worcester, 2013). Opinions can be altered 
relatively easily by certain events or new information and they can have a significant, 
however unsteady impact on public opinion. I argue that financial aid and a number of 
development projects provided through ENP and EaP are influencing mainly opinions and 
attitudes.  As demonstrated in the previous section, public opinion polls prove that after 2004 
and 2009 when these political frameworks were launched the inclination of Ukrainians 
towards the EU significantly rose and caused the sharpest changes in public opinion in the 
given time frame (Razmukov Centre, 2004-2012)6. However, according the Worcester´s 
theory this influence is likely to be unstable and once the development projects are terminated 
and financial aid decreases or is exhausted public support for the EU in Ukraine is expected to 
decline. On the other hand, most of the development projects, as well as conditions tied to 
financial aid are aimed to increase the level of democracy in Ukraine and reform its 
institutions, economy and society according the “western model”. This approximation of 
political, economic and social structures can bring the EU and Ukraine closer and influence 
public opinion long term. Nevertheless, the current difference between EU and Ukrainian 
systems are too large and it is questionable how long it will take to approximate it to EU 
standards to the extent that it will have a visible impact on public opinion.  Therefore, in order 
                                                 
6 See chart 1.A, p. 42 
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to assure steady support for the EU it is necessary to invest alongside development aid in 
other methods of public diplomacy which are analysed in the previous sections of this chapter, 
especially on the elements of public diplomacy that are based on attraction though promoting 
shared values and creating new shared values. Cultural Diplomacy is by many scholars 
recognized as an effective tool of bringing nations together and attracting foreign audiences.  
Exchange programs enhance intercultural understanding and contribute to the creation of 
personal connections between people from the EU and Ukraine. Advocacy and branding raise 
awareness of the EU by promoting its achievements and enhancing its soft power. 
Broadcasting and media are widely recognized instruments of opinion formation.  And 
finally, listening helps the international actor identify needs of target public, recognize shared 
values and tailor its public diplomacy strategies accordingly.  
 
The soft power of the EU is inseparable from the values that the EU represents. I defend the 
opinion that values, such as prosperity, stability and democracy, which according an OPPOL 
survey (2009) Ukrainian public identify with the EU, have been pulling the Ukrainians 
towards the EU gradually over a long period of time. The claim that Ukrainians are attracted 
by these values is underpinned by the results of public opinion surveys that reveal the 
problems of the Ukrainian people and actors that they believe can solve these problems. 
According the EU Neighbourhood Barometer (2012) 78 per cent of respondents judge the 
current economic situation in Ukraine as “bad” and 40 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the 
EU is the most capable institution to effectively help the economic development of the 
country, whilst only 14 per cent of them think that the CIS which includes Russia can offer a 
right solution to their economic problems (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). 
Furthermore, while most of Ukrainians identify the EU with democracy, 75 per cent of them 
are not satisfied with the level of democracy in their own country.   In the time frame 2004-
2012 the support for the EU was fluctuating but gradually rose almost 10 per cent, reaching its 
minimum during the euro crisis when  EU soft power and its image of strong economic power 
was devaluated7 (Razmukov Centre, 2004-2012).  Values and soft power are believed to have 
a steady, but not sharp influence on the changes of public opinion because the soft power of 
the EU is developing gradually. Significant change only happens if EU soft power is 
significantly strengthened or weakened, as happened during the euro crisis.   
 
                                                 
7  See chart 1.A, p. 42 
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Conclusion 
 
As recent history has proven several times, starting with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
through the Arab Spring to the latest turmoil in Ukraine, public opinion and ideas can change 
the political direction of the country, a country´s regime and even the world map. The Process 
of creation and distribution of ideas that can influence reality is highly important and the 
study of this process is necessary to comprehend recent events in Eastern Europe. At the same 
time, as outlined in the introduction and proved throughout the thesis, public diplomacy is of 
great importance for the EU. Effective public diplomacy helped architects of the EU to unite a 
divided continent. Public diplomacy also helps to increase EU´s soft power in the present and 
certainly will play a role in its future. This research is aimed to help understand and explain 
EU public diplomacy in Ukraine and its impact on Ukrainian foreign policy preferences. The 
limited extent of this thesis could not encompass all the aspects of this complex issue, 
however I hope this paper succeeded in reducing the gap in the IR literature dedicated to this 
matter and that it will stimulate a new academic discussion.  
 
To conclude, in this thesis I claim that the creation of an institutionalized and thus more 
visible political framework through which the EU conducts its public diplomacy towards 
Ukraine and implements its development projects in Ukraine is likely to invoke favourable 
attitudes towards the EU.  Furthermore, development aid will effectively influence the public 
opinion of Ukrainians only if it is sufficiently advertised in an understandable and reachable 
way.  Secondly, I advocate that the promotion of common values have a stable and gradual 
impact on public opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence attitudes and opinions of a 
foreign audience, such as a launch of a development project, have a less stable but more 
noticeable effect on public opinion. Financial incentives and development projects are directly 
influencing public opinions only whilst they are still in place. Moreover, this research 
revealed that the ENP is primarily focused on financial aid and assistance in development, 
whilst other important tools of public diplomacy such as listening, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchanges, international broadcasting and media and branding are, despite some 
progress reached in the past years, still neglected. Development aid has an unstable effect on 
Ukrainian attitudes toward the EU and the EU must endeavour to also develop other 
mechanisms of public diplomacy in order to effectively influence Ukrainian attitude toward 
the EU over a long period of time. 
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It is important to mention that this is not the first time that Ukraine has been on the crossroads 
of west-east. Events similar to those that broke out in 2013, also occurred in 1992-1994 and 
2002-2004, although less violent and on the smaller scale. It is crucial to bear in mind that 
Ukraine shifted its foreign policy orientation several times before and it is impossible to 
predict if Ukraine will make a definite choice this time. The ultimate reach of the 
consequences of this turmoil that is scourging Ukraine at the present time is yet to be 
discovered and it will also depend on the reactions of the EU and Russia.  The analysis can be 
useful for the future EU policies towards Ukraine or other CIS countries neighbouring the EU. 
 
There are several limitations to my research. Firstly, it is focused on the specific case of 
Ukraine and thus many findings cannot be generalised and used in the EU’s approach towards 
the countries in different regions outside the EU´s neighbourhood.  Furthermore, public 
opinion of Ukrainians has not been shaped solely by the public diplomacy of the EU, but also 
by influences of other world powers, particularly by Russia and by other external factors, 
which have to be taken into account.  Davison (2007, p. 8) warns that “Because psychological 
makeup, personal circumstances, and external influences all play a role in the formation of 
each person’s opinions, it is difficult to predict how public opinion on an issue will take 
shape. The same is true with regard to changes in public opinion. Some public opinions can 
be explained by specific events and circumstances, but in other cases the causes are more 
elusive”.  He claims that special events, especially crises can also have a strong impact on 
public opinion. The turmoil, instability and eroding sovereignty that Ukraine is facing at the 
moment can trigger unpredictable changes in public opinion. Moreover, for the purpose of 
this research I limited actors of the EU public diplomacy to supranational structures of the 
EU, however, the public opinion of the foreign audience can be shaped also by other actors, 
for example by individual members states, corporations, or various individuals.  
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10 Charts- Public Opinion Polls 
1 Foreign Policy Direction Preferences 
1.A “Which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine?” (2002-2012) 
 
Source: Razmukov centre. Available at: 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=305 
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1.B “What community should be priority for Ukraine to enter?” (2014) 
Source: Razmukov Centre. Available at: 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46,4% European 
Union  
35,7% Customs 
Union of Russia, 
Belarus and 
Kazakhstan 
17,8% Difficult to 
answer 
 
 
44 
 
2. Level of Information 
 “Could you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements concerning the European Union” (2012) 
 
 
 
Source: EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012. Available at: http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-UA-EN1.pdf 
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3. EU Image in Ukraine 
 “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, 
fairly negative or very negative image?” (2012) 
 
 
Source: EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012. Available at: http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-UA-EN1.pdf 
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